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Introduction
Can it be only 20 years ago that the World Leisure and 
Recreation Association issued the famous ‘Sao Paulo Declaration’ 
(WLRA 1995)? This called upon ‘the United Nations, all 
governments, all non-government organizations, World Leisure 
members and all citizens of the world’ to accept and promote 
‘the 10 Articles’. Article 1 states: ‘All persons have the right to 
leisure through economic, political and social policies that are 
equitable and sustainable.’
This is the foundation of the Declaration.  Upon it, the other 
9 articles follow. In order to facilitate comprehension, these can 
be organized into three meta-themes:
1) Inclusion
The right of all persons to celebrate and share diversity in 
leisure is confirmed. To this end, governments and institutions 
(private and public sectors) are called upon to ‘preserve and 
create barrier free environments’ to permit free movement and 
participation in leisure culture and practice.
2) Rights
Participation in leisure is redefined as a matter of Human 
Rights. All governments and institutions (private and public 
sectors) are called upon to ‘enact and enforce’ laws and policies 
that will provide ‘leisure for all’. Moreover, it also declares 
‘participation in the cultural life of the community’ as a right.
3) Order
All governments and institutions (private and public sectors) 
must guarantee the integrity of leisure by a) taking appropriate 
measures against forms and practices of leisure which are ‘deviant 
and criminal’; and b) monitoring ‘threats’ to the diversity and 
quality forms and practice of leisure caused by ‘the national and 
international consequences of globalization.’
 The Declaration adopts the tenor that the world is 
moving rapidly into a uniform new order. The nation-state is 
loosing its relevance and becoming supplemented by various 
multiple and exponential forms of transnational flows and 
links. These are held to have the effect of dismantling cultural 
barriers and opening up new opportunities for wealth creation. 
The ambitious objective in Article 1 of producing leisure, which 
is ‘equitable’ and ‘sustainable’ for all, implies that it is realistic 
to propose that a global leisure dividend is being created. The 
expectation is that it is both the advantaged and the disadvantaged 
are set to receive more leisure resources. Naturally, there are 
issues to be resolved with the respect to the ratio of resource 
allocation between strata.  Irrespective of this, the founding 
principle of the Declaration, that ‘all persons have the right to 
leisure’ clearly indicates that Inclusion, Rights and Order, is 
understood to apply to all. Analytically speaking, the Declaration 
may be read as a response among leisure professionals to new 
disaggregated global challenges by aggregating them around 
a set of rational-ethical parameters. The parameters are of a 
particular kind. They are value-laden, in a good sense. That 
is, around their ordinance, the 10 Articles, in conjunction with 
governments around the world, look forward to constructing 
the conditions for unity, tolerance and peaceful leisure practice 
and experience.  Although the details are not particularized, 
the whole tone of the Declaration implies an enhanced role for 
transnational leisure organizations and bilateral and multilateral 
forms of government. It is hard to see what other arrangement 
could deliver on the attainment and monitoring of issues relating 
to Inclusion, Rights and Order. But since this applies to the world 
order, it logically implies that leisure professionals must take a 
position on the persistence of presently existing autocracies and 
plutocracies.  For the continued existence of these governments 
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infringe on the right, integrity and freedom of leisure for all. 
Significantly, the Declaration maintains silence on this point.
The twin central pillars of the emerging world framework 
envisaged by the Declaration are globalization and 
cosmopolitanism. These are understood as non-linear, dialectical 
processes, which transform the global conditions of life. The 
Declaration proceeds on the basis that globalization is a universal 
transformative process which is changing the nature of local 
experience, the meaning of time and space and the character of 
moral life-worlds 1,2,3. Whatever one might think of the nature 
of the relationships between the local and the global, or how 
they might develop, the nucleus of globalization (as it pertains 
to intentionality, behaviour and outlook), is ‘overwhelming 
interconnectivity’4. This condition, with its palpable implications 
for capital flows, migration, data exchange and risk, is very 
much the decisive context in which the Declaration was 
prepared and published. Tacitly, globalization is assumed to be 
an inevitable process. There are three (unspecified) reasons for 
this. Firstly, globalization is held to maximize economic resource 
development by supporting the free movement of labour, capital 
and data. Secondly, globalization is believed to reduce the risk 
of nationalist military events by dissolving cultural, religious, 
political and nationalist barriers. Thirdly, globalization is said 
to enhance the development of judicial standards of universal 
justice by educating nations to the political interests and political 
determinations of other nations. The question for leisure 
professionals then, is not how to halt globalization. Rather, it 
is how to shape it in order to ensure that national leisure forms 
and practices are not co-opted or vapourized, and the vacant 
space turned into a sort of deterritorialized, commercially driven, 
monolithic, ‘leisure mega-world’.5 
In 1998 this was seen as the looming battle for Leisure 
Studies. It is the reason why Article 6, of the Declaration insists 
upon the need to monitor ‘threats to the diversity and quality of 
leisure’. Article 7, augments this with an undertaking to develop 
vigilance about potential abuses of leisure resulting from ‘local, 
national and international forces.’ Nowhere in the Declaration 
does the term ‘cosmopolitan’ occur. Yet the form of social 
consciousness of which it is an expression clearly recognizes 
the possibilities of trans-national forms of leisure experience 
and practice that universally observe the combined ordinance 
of unity, tolerance, peace and order. A clear interventionist 
and managerial role for leisure professionals is presupposed 
here, but the details of how it will be organized and enacted 
remain obscure.
The Declaration is indeed, an expression of what is now 
called cosmopolitanism. This is a many-sided concept 6,7,8. 
Various attempts have been made to pinpoint its key features. 
These include acknowledging that the world is moving into a 
position in which geographical proximity, as realized within 
the boundaries of the nation state, no longer has prior, or 
privileged, moral or necessarily, legal and judicial, purchase 
9. Trans-national loyalties and responsibilities to ‘humanity 
as a whole’ are said to be emerging as paramount 10[1] . What 
it means to be free (or freer) from ‘geographical proximity’ 
to the nation-state, or how trans-national loyalties may be 
applied to ‘humanity as a whole’, is nebulous. Despite this, 
cosmopolitans clearly take the view that the global expansion 
of capitalism, through greater physical mobility and the rise of 
digital communication, places intolerable burdens on the concept 
of the nation state as it has been traditionally conceived. The 
social determinations attached to the notion of a geo-political 
entity separated from others by inviolate territorial boundaries 
are no longer absolutely tenable. Regarding the all-important 
flow of ideas, technologies, finance, cultures and, to a large 
extent, people, no nation-state is insulated. It is not so much 
that people opt to engage with different identities, new forms 
of collective order, new ways of being and new solidarities. 
Rather, the new technologies, capital flows and communication 
networks of globalization make engagement impossible to avoid, 
or defer. The inference is that technology, capital flows and 
communication networks are at the root of cosmopolitanism, just 
as they are the driving forces behind globalization. This point 
requires qualification. It is not technology and communication 
networks that produce cosmopolitan consciousness, but rather, 
cosmopolitan consciousness that seeks to interpret and frame 
technology and communication networks around rational-ethical 
imperatives. Technological developments, capital flows and the 
growth of communication networks may lead the world into this 
or that direction. What makes the status of flow meaningful is 
how it is noticed and interpreted in the balance i.e. how it is 
communicated and rationalized. This suggests that the impact 
of globalization and cosmopolitanism is not a matter of fiat i.e. 
in this case, the assumption that technology and communication 
networks will bring the world’s population closer in their leisure, 
work, community values etc. Rather impact must be measured 
and understood through the articulation and, presumably, 
(quantifiable and qualitative) measurement, of cosmopolitan 
and global values, beliefs and practices in the concrete, material 
conditions and ways of life.   
Strictly speaking, no person, whether he or she be 
cosmopolitan in his/her outlook, or not, is independent of 
new technologies, communication networks and capital flows. 
Compared with Westerners, Amazonian tribesmen, and North 
Korean citizens who currently under the supreme leader, Kim 
Jong-un, may be said to live in positions of severely restricted 
access to global technologies, capital flows and communication 
networks. However, it strains credulity to propose that they can 
escape the gravitational pull of these forces. Even if they do 
not understand fully, or even significantly, what articulations 
of cosmopolitanism might mean to their own lives, many  of 
the most important consequences of globalization reduces 
them to a position of equivalence with the rest of the world’s 
[1] Nussbaum is one of strongest advocates of cosmopolitanism. She sees the 
latter as culminating in world citizenship, which is assumed to be superior to 
more local bonds e.g. ethnic, regional and national solidarities.  In this version 
of cosmopolitanism, local bonds are defended, but only to the extent that 
they do not conflict with cosmopolitan imperatives. This ‘strong’ version of 
cosmopolitanism has been much criticized for unintentionally introducing a 
latent form authoritarianism in the management of world affairs 54.
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[2] This term is not used in the Declaration. However, the logical outcome 
of the 10 Articles cumulatively point inescapably to this as a desired end of 
globalization and cosmopolitanism.
[3]  The term was coined by Horton and Wohl 55. Writing at the dawn of the 
television age, they used it to refer to the emotional relationships that tv audiences 
were forging with tv presenters. Para-social relationships were the first stage in 
what we no call ‘mediated identity’.
population. Indeed, the Declaration is perfectly right to suggest 
that certain aspects of the twin processes of globalization and 
cosmopolitanism make it valid to analyze conditions in terms of 
‘world society’ [2]. To cite the most obvious one, the main lesson 
that globalization imparts, namely, the increasing significance 
of overwhelming interconnectivity, also applies to the common 
risks of wellbeing and survival that humans face. Unarguably, 
technological, chemical, biological and nuclear enterprise delivers 
much. By the same token, it introduces shared hazard into common 
global relations. The effects of global environmental risks are not 
confined to the nations that produce them 11. The omnipresence 
of global risk means that it behoves anyone who is in a position 
to do so, to become at least semi-literate about the lives of others, 
and conversant with the local conditions that apply to them. 
While it is legitimate to nominate self-interest as part of the 
cosmopolitan outlook, it is not the only, or even the principal 
component. The lives of others have a higher profile in social 
consciousness because they constitute a greater portion of the 
texture of the consciousness and practice of everyday life. There are 
various reasons for this. The expansion of the mass media and the 
rapid rise of social media, multiply and expand data flows. Travel 
and tourism have brought more people into contact with cultures 
of difference. Even if this does not entail direct involvement in the 
sense of having physical contact with others, mass communications 
and social media have revolutionized para-social relations [3]. 
That is, the network of emotional relations conducted through 
electronic systems of communication between people who are 
otherwise, in terms of geography, culture and religion, remote 12. 
This is compatible with an immense multiplication in relationships 
of presumed intimacy between people whose only contact is 
through electronic media13. The number of direct contacts we 
have with others through Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat etc is 
actually only a very small part of what is involved here. They are 
out-numbered by the para-social relations we have with statistical 
men and women 14. That is, men and women with whom we have 
anonymous, one-sided contact, which significantly adds to our 
mental map of the lives of others. All of this has contributed to 
greater social consciousness about difference and diversity, without 
necessarily adding very much to an understanding in depth.  
Para-social relationships are a major feature of cosmopolitanism. 
However, the spread of ethnic and cultural diasporas into the West, 
in the form of long-term or permanent settlers should not be 
under-estimated. In the metropolitan centres of the core capitalist 
nations, significant multi-cultural and multi-ethnic populations 
have arrived from far afield and settled. Frequently, the religious 
customs, dress codes, cuisine, etc  that they have brought with 
them, offer immediate, and pointed, contrasts with Western 
traditions and conventions. This condition produces a form of 
social consciousness which is a variant of W.B. Du Bois’s 15 
famous concept of ‘double consciousness’. Developed in relation 
to the position of African Americans who are simultaneously 
divided in feeling that they belong to more than one world, Du 
Bois intended the concept to convey the sense of being both at 
‘home’ and ‘abroad’, ‘here’ and ‘there’, ‘unified’ and ‘separate’, 
‘together’ and ‘apart’. Plantation-slave culture imbued race 
relations in America with a heavy cargo of mental and social 
divisions. The Cosmopolitan outlook parallels this perspective. 
It encompasses the dimensions of race and ethnicity, but it is not 
limited to them. Rather it refers to the whole way of thinking 
about, and engaging with, cultural difference 16. Where culture 
is no longer monolithic and has moved into a concrete, material 
multi-cultural condition, there is very likely to be a good deal 
of regret and sentimentality about the old reality that has been 
replaced with the new reality. The Declaration refers to ‘the abuse 
and misuse’ of leisure customs and practice by globalization and 
cosmopolitanism, but it fails to supply tactics or procedures to 
minimize the advent of resentment arising from feelings that the 
old world has been lost.
In the study of leisure there are many contributions, which 
highlight the trend of globalization in tourism, sport and media 
17,18,19. There is every reason to believe that many more will follow. 
For, unquestionably, the Declaration was correct in highlighting 
the opportunities and challenges that the two interrelated processes 
pose for the quality and cohesion of leisure customs and practice. 
One assumption it made is that a universal conceptual currency is 
likely to emerge to comprehend and evaluate questions of morality 
in leisure customs and practice and the impact of globalization 
upon them. By this is meant that comprehension is understood 
and examined as belonging to a unitary, continuous, conjoined, 
logical space, that avoids segregation from paramount meaning 20. 
The articulation of Rights, Inclusion and Order in the Declaration 
is only possibly because it is based in the premise that the leisure 
professionals and governments will evolve a singular language 
to make sense of and communicate the issues. This premise of 
common currency is reminiscent of Kant’s advocacy of Reason 
as the triumphant agent of universal laws in human behaviour. 
But Kant also knew that it is a weakness in human nature to insist 
upon exceptions. This often takes the forms of making ‘special 
cases’ for one’s own conduct, that do not conform to normative 
disciplinary regimes, which are seen by the individual or group 
as ‘over-bearing’ and ‘over-regulated’ 21.
 For the Declaration, this side of Kant’s thinking casts 
a shadow over the idealist commitment to ‘Rights’, ‘Freedom’ 
and ‘Integrity’ in leisure customs and practice.  It suggests that 
there is no final resolution towards unity, tolerance and
inclusion in leisure. The pursuit of resolution, merely creates 
the conditions where exceptionalism will, in time, be asserted 22.
What is Wrong With Globalization and Cosmopolitanism?
The Declaration falls foul of the major criticisms that have 
been made of globalization and cosmopolitanism in wider 
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social theory. The first of these is that there is a gap between 
cosmopolitan intentions of wider social inclusion, empowerment 
and redistributive justice, and cosmopolitan practice 23. Since 
the early 1980’s, and until the banking and financial collapse 
in 2008, most economists credited globalization to be one of 
the indisputable prime levers in increasing profit margins and 
wealth concentration in the elite formations of the West. The 
redistributive effect from the advantaged to the disadvantaged, 
has not plugged the development gap.
Redistributive spurts have mainly benefited metropolitan 
elites and remained with a compound culture. It is this stratum 
that has experienced the greatest degree of flexibility, choice 
and self determination in leisure practice. Here the desiderata 
of the cosmopolitan lifestyle are evident. But for the most part, 
they have by-passed country folk (both within the capitalist core 
countries and the ‘developing’ nation-states of the periphery). 
By and large, the proliferation of the low wage economy and the 
emergence of casual employment or significant unemployment 
in industrial centres that were formerly thriving have left these 
groups facing a struggle to maintain long standing traditions 
of cultural solidarity, defend leisure customs and avoid the 
dilemmas of poverty 24. 
This leads to a second major point that is presented against 
exponents who make the positive case for globalization and 
cosmopolitanism. The hiatus between the claims made on behalf 
of the two processes, and the record of achievement with respect 
to indices of Inclusion, Rights and Order, raises the spectre that 
elites have been over-represented both in setting the agenda, 
and judging the results. Elites, usually based in the metropolitan 
hubs of the core, have been the main economic, cultural and 
political beneficiaries. Outside of these spaces, many strata in 
the core countries have been left behind by globalization and 
cosmopolitanism i.e. the twin processes have either not impacted 
on their traditional ways of life, or they have eliminated jobs. 
Where jobs have disappeared, the twin processes have contributed 
to the revival of nationalism expressed, most trenchantly, in 
demands for protectionism, restrictions on migration and the 
revival of a law and order society.  In this regard, it is probably 
true to say that elite interests have been well served by the vague 
nature of the indices of progress attached to globalization and 
cosmopolitanism. 
To come directly to what is concrete in the Declaration here, 
what does it actually mean to propose that ‘all persons have a 
need to celebrate and share diversity in leisure’ (Article 2)?  Is 
a billionaire’s celebration equivalent, or in any meaningful way, 
comparable, with someone living on the breadline?  
Article 3, makes it a requirement of governments to ‘preserve 
and create barrier-free environments’ to allow people to ‘express, 
celebrate and share leisure’. But anyone who has been obliged 
to apply for an international travel visa to visit or study abroad 
for a period of time in a foreign country without arrangements 
of parity, or pay tariffs on imported goods from a trade protected 
zone, can testify to the forest of legal and policing impediments 
to global ‘barrier-free environments’. 
Article 5, demands that all governments will ‘enact and 
enforce laws and policies’ to further the goal of ‘leisure for all’. 
But what sanctions or inducements are going to force governments 
to comply with this?  A demand that fails to provide the means 
by which it will be enforced is toothless. It conveniently invokes 
progressive action at purely, an abstract level, while suffering 
multi-national leisure corporations to act in the way that they have 
always done i.e. commercializing local pastimes and traditions, 
and extracting maximum surplus value from participation in the 
profit-driven leisure bonanza. Given all of this, it is hard to disagree 
with Rowe’s 25 that the Declaration suffers from operating with 
‘under-theorized, totalizing constructions of global processes and 
effects.’ Moreover, his supplementary point that world leisure 
organizations need to be more reflexive about how and why they 
are ‘implicated in the very processes that they are critiquing’ 26.
Defenders of cosmopolitanism and globalization respond by 
insisting that both processes are more grounded and decisive than 
their detractors would have you believe. The global economy 
and international relations may not be functioning according to 
the highest ideals of cosmopolitanism, but they are part of an 
ongoing process, and great strides have been made 27. Yet when 
one looks at the track record of the global institutions today 
that follow the cosmopolitan brief on behalf of the world the 
position does not seem to be so rosy. The United Nations, and 
the International Criminal Court are often portrayed as the very 
embodiment of cosmopolitanism. Their history in anticipating 
international conflicts, or bringing war criminals to book has 
been chequered. In other words, the trans-national institutions 
that have been created to produce understanding beyond barriers, 
a sense of common rights, responsibilities and joys, can claim 
only a partial success.
More regionally, within Europe, a cogent argument has 
been made that the European Union (EU) is fundamentally 
cosmopolitan. This is most fully articulated by Jurgen Habermas 
28. For him, the legacy of the European memory of the holocaust, 
is not only the acceptance of domestic moral responsibilities 
by European citizens, but an awareness of trans-national moral 
duties. Yet the gap between the aspirations and achievements 
of European cosmopolitanism as it is actually practised at the 
nation-state level, remains a major cause of concern. The austerity 
programme that Brussels and Berlin inflicted upon the ailing 
economies of Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain after 
the Financial crash (2008) are more reminiscent of the power 
politics of Metternich than Jean Monnet 29,30,31.
At the present time the reaction to globalization and 
cosmoplitanism is heightened by the revival of nationalism in the 
USA and the European Union; the persistence of the development 
gap between the economically advanced countries and the 
developing world; and the proliferation of religious antagonisms 
between Islamic Fundamentalism and the Christian Far Right. The 
Declaration is tone deaf to the causes that led to this important 
issues. The shadow thought of Kant on exceptionalism does not 
figure. When all is said and done, the Sao Paulo Declaration 
reproduces the central assumptions of positive, liberal perspectives 
on globalization and cosmopolitanism.  In particular, it follows 
what Craig Calhoun calls, ‘the attractive illusion’ of the positive 
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Kantian position 32. Namely, that the twin processes will transcend 
social determinations by providing more freedom and greater 
universalism. Hence, the insistence in the Declaration upon 
‘celebrating’ and ‘sharing’ leisure diversity and ‘maintaining 
the freedom and integrity of leisure’. 
 It is unsatisfactory to think of globalization and 
cosmopolitanism as undifferentiated, uniform processes. Neither 
rolls over mankind in the same way, because mankind starts 
by being unequally positioned in relation to scarce resources. 
This unequal positioning is obscured by documents like the 
Declaration because they are pitched and operate in terms of what 
Pollock 33 calls ‘singular personhood’. That is, they fail to locate 
individual choice convincingly, in relation to material, cultural 
and political levels of inequality. It is these levels that position 
people differently and give a leisure based in freedom and integrity 
for some, while denying it for others. The diversity, integrity and 
freedom of leisure can never be a matter of individual choice or 
self-determination. Before an individual can chose a leisure option 
and participate in a leisure activity they are already positioned 
in relation to scarce resources. If ‘freedom’ and ‘integrity’ mean 
anything, they mean directly addressing the question of scarce 
resources, not as a side issue of individual choice, but the very 
fulcrum upon which individual conduct finally spins.
When all is said and done, the juxtaposition between 
singular personhood and abstract processes like globalization 
and cosmopolitanism sets a trap from which it is difficult to 
escape.  How to get out?  One promising way is to stop thinking 
of globalization and cosmopolitanism as blanket processes. This 
is not just a matter of introducing notions such as ‘glocalization’ 
to capture the idea that globalization and cosmopolitanism are 
not ‘one way’ processes. An exchange, a transference, a balance 
of power is always involved 34,35,36.
 It is also a matter of conceptualizing globalization and 
cosmopolitanism as multi-polar 37. That is, within each of the twin 
processes, there is enormous differentiation. This means that those 
positioned in relation to scarce resources relate to globalization, 
cosmopolitanism and leisure in radically different ways. Elite 
formations may have experienced increased flexibility, choice 
and self-determination. However, formations positioned nearer 
the poverty line are likely to have a converse relationship with 
globalization and cosmopolitanism. Their experience of flexibility, 
choice and self-determination in leisure is threatened on many 
fronts.  Globalization and cosmopolitanism weaken traditional 
leisure customs by diverting resources from localities. This often 
takes the form of cuts in central public finance and support for 
local leisure traditions. In addition, globalization often weakens 
local job markets by transferring jobs to the developing world or 
depressing local wage rates.  The emergence of ‘rust belt’ cities in 
the USA, and declining industrial cities in the European Union, 
have increased deficit margins in local leisure economies. 
The Economic Dimension of the Problem
The financial crash of 2008 intensified and exacerbated the 
schisms in globalization and cosmopolitanism and the quandries 
that arise from them. The recession has been far more severe 
and protracted than the economic contractions of 1974-76 
and 1980-82 38. In the 18 months after the recession, US GDP 
declined by 4.1%; UK GDP fell by 6.3%; and US investment 
fell by 23.4% 39,40. The fall in real wages translates into a 
reduction in macroeconomic demand. The shortfall in liquidity 
has been corrected by extending the credit economy. But there 
are structural limits to the capacity of credit to operate as a 
holding measure. It is reported that in the USA home foreclosures 
tripled between 2006 and 2009, to almost 2.5 million. In the first 
quarter of 2012 consumer debt in the USA was $11.4 trillion 
(of which $904 billion was student debt) (Investor’s Business 
Daily 1.6.2012). Students owe nearly a trillion dollars of debt, 
an average of $25,000 per student. Since the crash, 25 million 
people in the USA have lost their jobs through factories closing 41.
In July 2012 outstanding personal debt in the UK stood at 
£1.410 trillion.  Average household debt (excluding mortgages) 
was £5,972.  The average amount owed by UK adults (including 
mortgages) was £28,704.  Between July 2011 and July 2012, 
the total interest repayments on personal debt was £60.0 billion. 
The Office of Budget Responsibility predicts that household 
debt will climb to £2.044 trillion by the end of 2017 (www.
creditaction.org.uk). 
Within the EU the average rate of unemployment rose from 
6.7% in March 2008, to 8.9% in March 2009; leaving 21.5 
million citizens without a job 42. Five years later it had risen to 
9.0% 43. Unemployment rates in the Southern economies in the 
periphery of the Eurozone are disturbingly high. In June 2014, 
the rate for adults (25-74 year olds) was 10.5%; in Portugal, 
12.5%; in Spain, 22.4%; in Greece 25.4% and in Ireland 10.7%. 
However, when one turns to rates of youth unemployment in 
these countries the mood of disturbance escalates to something 
approaching panic. In Italy, the rate for 16-24 year olds was 
43.7%; in Portugal 33.5%; in Spain 53.5%; in Ireland 23.2%; 
and in Greece 53.1%.  Compare his with adult and youth rates 
in the wealth core countries of the Eurozone.  In Germany, the 
adult rate was 4.8%, and youth rate was 7.8%; in Denmark, 
5.5% and 12.6%; in the UK, 4.6% and 17.9%; in the Netherlands 
6.1% and 10.5%, and in France 8.9% and 22.$%. In the USA 
the respective rates were 5.0% and 13.3% 44. A generation is 
being denied the opportunities for social mobility and building 
a stake in society that, for most of the postwar years have been 
seen as a birthright of those located in the West.
But the exposure of the credit economy as a fig leaf for major 
structural problems in the West does not end there. Governments 
that had borrowed without adequate collateral, were faced with 
demands from international banks and debt repayments. In 
particular, peripheral economies in the Eurozone, namely Ireland, 
Spain, Portugal, Italy and, above all, Greece, faced bankruptcy 
45. By and large, the fiscal and monetary stimulus measures 
adopted since the crash have failed to restore buoyant growth 
or significantly reduce accumulated debt 46. Between 2008 and 
2016 Governments’ debt-to-GDP ratios have risen from 41% 
to 74%, from 47% to 70% in the EU, and from 95% to 126% 
in Japan. High ratios usually produce an interest rate hike. Yet 
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10-year government bond rates in the USA are currently 2%, 
around 0.5% in Germany and around 0.2% in Japan. Since 2008, 
despite near zero rates in the USA, and real interest rates of zero 
in the Eurozone, the West has been in a condition of ‘secular 
stagnation’ 47.  That is, a structural condition in which there is a 
serious imbalance between an increasing propensity to save and 
a decreasing propensity to invest. This disequilibrium depresses 
economic activity by compounding funds in banks, financial 
management organizaton’s and fixed assets. Low liquidity 
makes the problem worse. The brief spurt in growth in America 
between 2003 and 2007, was reliant upon the transference of 
unsustainable levels of savings into insupportable levels of 
investment. This produced the housing crisis.  
The increasing propensity to save is the product of many 
factors. Among the most significant are the rising inequality 
gap between the rich and poor, new uncertainties about the 
retirement age, threats to the stability of benefits produced by 
austerity programmes and a greater concentration of assets in 
foreign central banks and sovereign wealth management funds. 
The impact on the inequality gap in the Anglophone countries 
is severe. In the USA, the top 0.1% of families have increased 
their share of wealth, decade by decade. It expanded from 7% 
in 1978, to 22% in 2012 48. Over the same period, the value of 
real wages has fallen.  In the UK, between 1980 and 2011, wage 
share of output fell from 59.1% to 53.7%. Between 1990 and 
2009, the median wage across the OECD member states declined 
from 66.1% to 61.7% 49. In the Anglophone, governments have 
displayed a stubborn reluctance to apply fiscal measures against 
the richest in society. Instead, generally speaking, public policy 
has concentrated upon applying austerity measures of various 
degrees of intensity. These have had the most damaging effect 
on people on or near the poverty line. In addition, cuts in public 
expenditures have increased the leisure deficit in local economies 
and reinforced the trend to weaken local leisure traditions.  
Conclusion
It is no part of my argument to accuse the architects of the 
Sao Paulo Declaration (1998) of bad faith. In drawing up the 
document they were not acting on behalf of the interests of the 
global elites in business, government or military relations. On 
the contrary, the Declaration displays idealism in respect of its 
commitment to the principle that ‘all persons have the right 
to leisure’. Nor were the architects wrong in proposing that 
globalization and what we now call, cosmopolitanism, amount 
to a tectonic challenge to orthodox ways of conceptualizing 
and practising leisure. However, despite the acknowledgement 
that some aspects of globalization constitute threats to leisure, 
notably in relation to the over-commercialization of practices, 
risk and other ‘abuses and misuses’, the Declaration is far too 
sanguine.  It fails to grasp that globalization and cosmopolitanism 
do not simply enrich social and economic exchange. They also 
impoverish leisure experience for what, following the election 
of Donald Trump as President, and the Brexit vote of 2016, 
[4] The ‘New Caeserism’ is a term invented by Oswald Spenger in his famous 
book The Decline of the West 56. Spengler argued that one symptom of the 
decline of the West was the tendency of Plebiscitary Parliamentary Democracy 
to perpetually promise what it perpetually fails to deliver. Politically speaking, 
the system produces regular crises. In times of major crises, there is a tendency 
for ‘strong leaders’ to emerge and dominate.
have become known as ‘the left behind’. These are the strata 
in the capitalist core who have seen their leisure traditions 
undermined by centrally directed programmes of austerity, 
static or falling real wages, the onslaught of casualized labour 
and unemployment, rising property prices making housing 
unaffordable and the rising costs of tertiary education. In what 
sense can the defence of integrity and freedom in leisure customs 
and practice be spoken of, in a social and economic condition 
where many people, especially, those of adult age between 18 
and 30, cannot expect to own their own home or cover their 
own health costs?  
The optimism of the Declaration is over-blown.  For example, 
Article 8 grandly calls upon ‘all private and public spheres’ 
to implement policies designed to ‘provide leisure education 
curricula and programmes for school and community systems.’ 
What is the point of such an education if people do not have 
full time work that enables them to earn an income that can 
meaningfully support leisure choices or live in affordable 
housing?  The net effect of undertakings, like Article 8, is to 
make many people, again, specifically young people, regard the 
architects of the Declaration to be out of touch with the lives 
of ordinary folk.
The lack of grounded reality in the Sao Paulo declaration 
exposes its tactics as faulty. A rule of effective politics is that it 
is unwise to make promises that have a small chance of being 
fulfilled.  The Declaration is awash with undertakings of this 
sort. ‘All persons have the right to leisure’; ‘all governments and 
institutions should preserve and create barrier-free environments’; 
‘all governments will enact and enforce laws and policies 
designed to provide leisure for all’; these are laudable objectives, 
but they are only convincing if clear headway can be made 
to sustain them. Since 1998, his has not been achieved. The 
schisms in globalization and cosmopolitanism have renewed 
nationalist demands. 
The effect of the decline in the labour market and the erosion 
of local customs and traditions is demonstrable in the rise of a 
‘new Caesarism’ in the European Union [4]. Geert Wilders and 
the Party for Freedom movement in the Netherlands; Marine 
Le Pen and the Front National in France; Nikolas Michaioiakos 
and the Golden Dawn Party in Greece; the AfD (Alternative for 
Germany) in Germany; and Boris Johnson, Michael Gove in 
the Brexit movement in the UK, are all in favour of increasing 
protectionism, raising barriers to reduce migration and impede 
the free movement of labour and increase law and order 
provisions. This is mirrored with President Trump’s exploitation 
and heightening of nationalism in the USA and Vladimir Putin’s 
authoritarian populism in Russia.  None of this bodes well for 
either globalization or cosmopolitanism. It suggests that the 
multipolar character of the twin processes produces divisions 
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[5] The term ‘Majority’ her refers to the legal age in which citizens are entitled 
to vote.
between cosmopolitanism and nationalism in single countries that 
contribute to the paralysis of the political system and increase 
the risk of civil unrest. 
One side effect of this is that leisure relations are likely to 
become more politicized. There is the question of protecting 
traditional leisure traditions that have been undermined by 
centralized austerity programmes. This is reason enough for 
people who feel that organized politics have not listened to 
them and even, not recognized them, estranged from a system 
that seems loaded for the rich 50. Perhaps of greater longer 
term significance is the issue of educating and supporting 
people to exercise their right to leisure in meaningful ways. Of 
central importance here is how to revitalize leisure experience 
in the midst of the contraction in the labour market caused by 
globalization. One important aspect of this is the emergence 
of new robot intelligence technologies, which point to a 
deepening of labour market contraction. Immense claims are 
being made for the impact on lifestyle and safety of driverless 
cars 51. It is estimated that driverless cars will create 320,000 
jobs in the UK 52. The introduction of robotic labour into the 
service sectors of transport, health care, education is set to 
escalate. Automation has long been a conventional feature of 
advanced industrialization.  Fordism was based upon it. What 
is new about the industrial revolution of our own times is that 
automated labour is no longer confined to standardized tasks. 
Increasingly robotic labour adds value by producing non-routine 
and cognitive tasks. The inevitable effect is to shed human labour. 
Mass unemployment is not politically sustainable. However, the 
new industrial revolution offers opportunities to think outside 
of the world of globalization, cosmopolitanism, work and 
leisure envisaged by the Sao Paulo Declaration.  One aspect of 
this is to take seriously the idea of introducing Universal Basic 
Income (UBI), payable to all citizens on reaching majority  . A 
second pressing concern is to address the global wealth gap 53. 
In 2016 Global Wealth was estimated to be USD 256 trillion. 
The wealthiest 10% of the world’s population own 89& of all 
global assets.  The poorest 50% own global assets worth less 
than 1% of the total.  Between 2010-2015 the wealth of the 
richest 62 people in the world rose by 45%, while that of the 
poorest 50% fell by 38% (Credit Suisse 2016). Article 3 of the 
Declaration submits that government should create and ‘barrier 
free environments’ to pursue freedom, integrity and diversity 
in leisure customs and practice. The greatest barrier facing 
globalization and cosmopolitanism is the global wealth gap.  It 
requires leisure professionals and governments to apply fiscal 
policies and judicial measures to tackle vested interests. If this 
is not done, documents like the Sao Paulo Declaration will be 
ineffectual. It does not have and it has not built a ‘consensual 
programmatic dimension’. Everything points to the conclusion 
that world conditions in technology, economic distribution 
and risk factors, require leisure professionals to become far 
more political.
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